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Mark J. Thompson* and Katie M. McDonough**
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that courts overseeing chapter 11 cases have
been mistakenly invoking the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Till
v. SCS Credit Corp.—which specified a consumer-friendly formula
for setting the interest rate on the remaining payments on a loan that
financed a used pickup truck—at the expense of over a century of
Supreme Court precedents that established the contrastingly creditorfriendly “fair and equitable” standard for repayment of business
debts, as well as disregarding a clear statutory distinction between
the present value tests in chapters 11 and 13. This Article also
discusses the controversial 2014 decision in Momentive Performance
Materials and is particularly helpful in light of the recent publication
by the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of its
voluminous 2012–2014 Final Report and Recommendations. That
Report concludes, with little explanation, that Till should not be
applied in chapter 11 cases. This Article provides a detailed
justification of that position, serving as a guide for judges who are
tasked with analyses of chapter 11 cramdown interest rates and
assisting those practitioners who would argue that application of the
Till “prime-plus” formula violates existing “fair and equitable”
jurisprudence. This Article also provides academics with additional
historical and jurisprudential background concerning Till in the
consumer bankruptcy context.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2004, a divided Supreme Court decided Till v. SCS Credit
Corp.,1 mandating use of a “prime-plus” formula to determine the
interest rate applicable to repayment over time of a secured creditor’s
claim in a chapter 13 (consumer) bankruptcy. The “prime-plus” formula
substantially reduced the amount repaid to secured creditors as
compared to the interest rates that consumer credit usually entails.
Subsequently, courts have interpreted dicta in Till’s plurality opinion to
require use of the same “prime-plus” formula in chapter 11 (business)
bankruptcies, in spite of a century or more of Supreme Court precedent
developing the “absolute priority” doctrine, which has provided
creditors with greater recoveries in corporate reorganizations. While the
1.

Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).

2015]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

895

plurality’s dicta undoubtedly put the matter of chapter 11 interest rates
into play, a “deep dive” into the proceedings before the Till Court
reveals that the field of chapter 11 jurisprudence was barely mentioned
in the briefing, argument, or the Justices’ questions. This lack of judicial
analysis throws into question the weight lower courts have uncritically
accorded Till’s chapter 11 dicta. Further, when we contrast the relevant
sections of chapter 13 and chapter 11 (a task surprisingly unperformed
by the lower courts that have extended Till to the chapter 11 context),
they prove far more dissimilar than those courts have assumed. The
decisions extending Till’s consumer-protecting formula to business
bankruptcies rest on a superficial deference to the plurality’s dicta that
becomes untenable when measured against the full record of
proceedings in Till and the relevant statutory language.
Ultimately, we argue the Till “prime-plus” method for pricing
interest rates in chapter 13 was endorsed by Till’s plurality solely as a
pragmatic response to certain characteristics specific to chapter 13 that
are not found in chapter 11. This conclusion enables Till to stand on its
own as a chapter 13 pronouncement, while remaining harmonious with
the long line of Supreme Court decisions in the business reorganization
context that have provided secured creditors greater protection than the
Tills’ lender received.
Part I of this article contains a brief history of the Supreme Court’s
development of the “fair and equitable” standard and the absolute
priority doctrine in business reorganization. Part II provides an overview
of cramdowns under the current Code as set forth in chapter 11 and
chapter 13.2 Part III presents a “deep dive” into the Supreme Court
proceedings in Till with a focus on the practical and fact-specific
considerations that led to the fractured decision. Part IV reviews how
lower courts are mistakenly applying Till in chapter 11 bankruptcies.
Part V argues that Till has no place in chapter 11 cramdowns and that
courts should instead revert to following the century’s worth of existing
Supreme Court opinions and their progeny that specifically address
treatment of creditors in chapter 11 cramdowns.

2. Confirmation standards under chapter 11 and chapter 13 require that either, (1)
the court finds that all classes of creditors accept the plan, or (2) if an impaired class of
creditors votes against the plan (and therefore is a “dissenting” class), the court find that
the plan meets certain additional standards set forth in § 1129(b) or § 1325(a)(5). See 11
U.S.C. § 1129 (2012); 13 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). Confirmation over the objection of a
dissenting class after those additional findings are made is called a “cramdown.”
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I. PRE-CODE DEVELOPMENTS: THE “FAIR AND EQUITABLE”
STANDARD AND THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the absolute priority
doctrine over the past century. The doctrine is most famously associated
with the Court’s 1913 decision in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd,
which stated that a plan of reorganization may not provide value to
shareholders until all creditors’ claims were first satisfied in full.3 But
when it came to reorganization practice, Boyd was honored mostly in the
breach,4 as business bankruptcies in that era tended instead to apportion
debt reduction among the different layers of the businesses’ capital
structure in a negotiated manner.5 The practice tended to favor
stockholders (often managers of the business or prominent members of
the local business community) to the detriment of the most senior
creditors (often more distant investors who had purchased the
company’s secured bonds as a source of steady income).6 The
3. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913) (“If the value of the road
justified the issuance of stock in exchange for old shares, the creditors were entitled to
the benefit of that value, whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for
purposes of control. In either event it was a right of property out of which the creditors
were entitled to be paid before the stockholders could retain it for any purpose
whatever.”).
4. See ARTHUR STONE DEWING, 2 THE FINANCING POLICY OF CORPORATIONS
1303–04 (5th ed. 1953) (“In the twenty-five years following the Boyd case little was
added to clarify the extent to which the absolute priority rights of creditors could be
carried. . . . At all events reorganization plans gave lip service to the Boyd decision
without weighing too nicely the value of shares of stock the entire worth of which
rested on future undetermined earning power.”).
5. See id. at 1299–1300 (explaining that following the panic of 1893, the “relative
priority” theory was employed, “[A] hierarchy of relative values was worked out in
which creditors and stockholders were each called upon to make certain sacrifices, but
after these had been exacted, the claim of each security-holder was given a place in the
reorganization in the order of priority . . . . [N]o hard line of demarcation was drawn
between bondholder and stockholder, each being regarded as a contributor to the
railroad’s capital and therefore, in accordance with their relative priority, entitled to
participate in the reorganization . . . . [T]he rigor of the bondholders’ lien on the
corporate property was softened in order to justify the participation by the old
stockholders in the securities of the new company.”). Id. The Boyd decision did not
immediately alter this arrangement. See id.
6. John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963,
969-71 (1989); see DEWING, supra note 4, at 1275 n.mmmm (“It has been long known
that many reorganization committees of bankrupt real estate companies were little more
than a racket. Field cites a case within his personal knowledge, of a real estate default—
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negotiation over the divvying up of debt reduction often led to
protracted proceedings that struck observers as inefficient.7 Worst of all,
as debt reduction was not an outcome that creditors embraced
enthusiastically, the “relative priority” practice frequently left
companies overly leveraged when they eventually did emerge, to the
dismay of economic policy makers.8
In 1934, Congress passed the nation’s first corporate reorganization
statute, which codified the Boyd doctrine that a plan be “fair and
equitable” prior to confirmation. Again, however, the edict did not
adequately protect creditors in practice. As one contemporary scholar
explained:
[i]n many cases, it was charged, the committees or others
purportedly representing the bondholders, general creditors and
stockholders in the informal negotiations resulting in the final plan,
were not actually effective and independent representatives of the
interests they purported to serve. In some cases, . . . such committees
or other representatives were in fact affiliated with or even
designated by the old management or other “inside” interests, whose
real purpose might be to perpetuate existing control and cover up
9
possible past mismanagement.

In short, shareholders continued to retain value at the expense of
creditors, even under the new reorganization statute.10

with a ‘committee’ organized by the managing owners—apparently for no other
purpose than of defraud the individual bondholders.”); id. at 1275–81 and
accompanying notes for examples illustrating the problem of committees, including that
they often inadequately served their constituents.
7. See, e.g., John H. Crider, Court Ruling Seen Speeding 77B Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 1939, at 48; DEWING, supra note 4, at 1256, n.uu.
8. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and
the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 932-36
(2001).
9. Emmet McCaffery, Corporate Reorganization Under the Chandler Bankruptcy
Act, 26 CAL. L. REV. 643, 650 (1938).
10. See Perry Anderson, U.S. Supreme Court Rule of Valuation as Applied to
Corporate Reorganization, 27 MARQ. L. REV. 111, 123 (1943) (“The principle of
absolute priority has recently been restated in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. The absolute priority rule had earlier been stated in
the U. S. Supreme Court decision in Northern Pacific R.R. v. Boyd but so many
reorganizations later followed the rule of relative priority that it became necessary to
clarify and state definitely the rule to be followed in reorganizations.”) (citation
omitted).
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The very next year, a Supreme Court dominated by New Deal era
reformers, urged on by fellow reformer Solicitor General Robert
Jackson on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Interstate Commerce Commission, seized upon a small, largely
consensual Chapter X reorganization to torpedo these practices.11 The
resultant opinion in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.
reaffirmed in no uncertain terms that “fair and equitable” requires
faithful adherence to the absolute priority doctrine.12 Justice Douglas
wrote:
“fair and equitable” . . . are words of art which prior to the advent of
section 77B had acquired a fixed meaning through judicial
interpretations in the field of equity receivership reorganizations.
Hence, as in the case of other terms or phrases used in that
section . . . we adhere to the familiar rule that where words are
employed in an act which had at the time a well known meaning in
the law, they are used in that sense unless the context requires the
13
contrary.

The court thus confirmed that “fair and equitable” is a term of art
with a fixed meaning.
In Los Angeles Lumber, the Court rejected the assertion that it was
“fair and equitable” to make secured bondholders share with equity
interests the going concern premium, even though the premium would
have been lost in a liquidation but was preserved by the cooperation of
equity interests in reorganization.14 The Court explained that liquidation
was not the only alternative, because the court could have approved a
going concern reorganization that delivered all the ownership to the
secured creditors.15 Therefore, the equity interests were entitled to
nothing in exchange for filing a voluntary petition for reorganization
rather than being forced into an involuntary liquidation.16 On remand,
the District Court approved a modified plan that delivered all the value

11.
12.
13.

See Crider, supra note 7, at 48.
Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
L.A. Lumber, 308 U.S. at 115 (citing Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434,
446 (1899)).
14. Id. at 124.
15. Id. at 131.
16. Id.
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of the business to the secured creditors and wiped out the equity’s
stake.17
Two years later, in Consolidated Rock Products v. Du Bois, the
Supreme Court again overturned a confirmed plan because it failed the
“fair and equitable” standard in its treatment of creditors.18 In another
opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court held that the plan “comes within
judicial denunciation because it does not recognize the creditors’
‘equitable right to be preferred to stockholders against the full value of
all property belonging to the debtor corporation.’”19 The Court further
opined that
[T]he bondholders have not been made whole. They have received
an inferior grade of securities, inferior in the sense that the interest
rate has been reduced, a contingent return has been substituted for a
fixed one, the maturities have been in part extended and in part
eliminated by the substitution of preferred stock, and their former
strategic position has been weakened. Those lost rights are of value.
Full compensatory provision must be made for the entire bundle of
20
rights which the creditors surrender.

This passage illustrates the Supreme Court’s settled view that a
creditor’s “entire bundle of rights” merit protecting, and, where junior
interests participate in a reorganization, senior creditors must be “made
whole” for the plan to satisfy the “fair and equitable” standard.21
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 carried the “fair and
equitable” language into the modern era with procedural modification
that resulted in what is known as a “relaxed” version of the absolute
priority standard.22 Under the current Code, if a class of creditors
accepts the reorganization plan, the class’s treatment under the plan will

17. See DEWING, supra note 4, at 1309, n.o (“Following the Supreme Court
decision the district judge approved an ‘absolute priority’ reorganization in which all
the issued stock was given to the bondholders—all the previous stockholders were
eliminated.”).
18. Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
19. Id. at 529 (emphasis added) (citing Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union
Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 454 (1926)).
20. Id. at 527–28 (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 207 (1988) (stating
that “the Code provides that a “fair and equitable” reorganization plan is one which
complies with the absolute priority rule”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012)).
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not be scrutinized by the “fair and equitable” standard.23 If, however,
that class of creditors dissents, then the plan proponent must show that
its proposed treatment of the class satisfies the “fair and equitable”
standard for the plan to be confirmed.24 This “encourages a negotiated
restructuring and eliminates the necessity of establishing the going
concern value of a company in every case,”25 but it also protects the
interests of a dissenting class of creditors from inequitable treatment visà-vis the interests of creditors junior to it.
Congress reformed the Code with no intention of severing the
incorporated phrase “fair and equitable” from the meaning given it by
cases like Boyd and Los Angeles Lumber.26 Contemporaneous
statements by participants in the reform underscore the view that section
1129 cramdown standards were reformed to protect secured creditor
interests. Kenneth Klee, the House Judiciary Committee staffer most
involved in drafting the Code (including chapter 11 and chapter 13)27
stated that the new Code would afford additional “protection for secured
claims that is not provided under present law,”28 and Ronald Trost, a
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference who was deeply
involved in the 1970s reform project, wrote: “In the usual chapter 11
case either secured creditors will consent to the plan or the business will
not be able to be reorganized.”29 The intent of the reform, then, was
certainly not to weaken recoveries by chapter 11 secured creditors.

23. If no class dissents, the plan must satisfy only the conditions set forth in 11
U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(1)–(16).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
25. MICHAEL A. GERBER, BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 734, 744 (2d. ed. 2000).
26. See H.R. REP NO. 95-595 at 413 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6369 (explaining that subsection (b) “requires simply that the plan meet certain
standards of fairness to dissenting creditors or equity security holders. The general
principle of the subsection permits confirmation notwithstanding nonacceptance by an
impaired class if that class and all below it in priority are treated according to the
absolute priority rule. . . . That is, if the class is impaired, then they must be paid in full
or, if paid less than in full, then no class junior may receive anything under the plan.
This codifies the absolute priority rule from the dissenting class on down.”).
27. Kenneth Klee was one of the principal draftsmen of the Code. J. Ronald Trost,
Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 BUS.
LAW 1309, 1309 n.* (1979).
28. See Kenneth Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 143 (1979).
29. See Trost, supra note 27, at 1335 n.182.
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II. THE CURRENT CODE AND POST-CODE DEVELOPMENTS
A. CRAMDOWN UNDER SECTION 1129
The text of Section 1129(b)(1) of the Code states that where there is
a dissenting class, the plan must be “fair and equitable, with respect to
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not
accepted, the plan.”30 Section 1129(b)(2) thereafter lists three separate
tests to assist in determining whether a plan is “fair and equitable” to
dissenting classes: one each for classes of secured claims, unsecured
claims, and equity interests.31
The test for secured claims set forth in Section 1129(b)(2)(A)
contains three disjunctive criteria for the plan to be “fair and equitable”
with respect to a dissenting class of secured claims. The criterion
relevant to this article is the first, which permits confirmation so long as
the secured claimholder retains its lien and receives deferred cash
payments that are (1) equal to at least the allowed amount of the claim
and (2) have “a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the
value of such holder’s interest” in the collateral securing the claim
(hereinafter referred to as the “deferred payments” condition).32 There is
little question that the language “value, as of the effective date of the
plan” equates to the present value of the sum in question.33 This latter

30.
31.
32.

11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). With respect to a class of unsecured claims,
the plan must provide: (i) “that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on
account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to
the allowed amount of such claim” or (ii) “the holder of any claim or interest that is
junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of
such junior claim or interest any property . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B). Similarly,
with respect to a class of equity interests, the plan must provide: (i) “that each holder of
an interest of such class receive or retain on account of such interest property of a value,
as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any
fixed liquidation preference to which such holder is entitled, any fixed redemption price
to which such holder is entitled, or the value of such interest; or (ii) the holder of any
interest that is junior to the interests of such class will not receive or retain under the
plan on account of such junior interest any property.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C); see
Richard Maloy, A Primer on Cramdown—How and Why it Works, 16 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 1, 14 (2003).
33. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 408, 413, 414 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6364, 6369, 6370.
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requirement, then, calls for calculation of the present value of the
deferred payments as of the effective date of the plan and a
determination that such value is at least equal to the value of the secured
claim (hereinafter referred to as the “chapter 11 present value test”).
Within this statutory scheme, various factors affect the value of
deferred cash payments. In particular, the discount rate applies when
calculating the present value of the payments.34 Typically, in chapter 11
cramdowns, experts offer evidence of current market conditions. They
will also value the enterprise as a going concern and, if necessary, value
the proposed repayment so the court can decide whether, in light of the
current market, the treatment of the class is “fair and equitable.” Each of
these factors impacts the ultimate value of the repayments to be made,
and therefore the value of the recovery of secured creditors, which is
used to determine compliance with the absolute priority doctrine.
In the more than 35 years since the Bankruptcy Code was adopted,
the Supreme Court has confirmed in no uncertain terms that the absolute
priority rule “gained express statutory force, and was incorporated into
Chapter 11 . . . .”35 Moreover, the Court has continued its practice of
applying the rule strictly. In Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
decided in 1988, the Court held that the absolute priority doctrine is
violated even where debtors retain otherwise “worthless” equity
interests over the objection of an impaired class.36 The Court stated that
“the Code provides that it is up to the creditors—and not the courts—to
accept or reject a reorganization plan which fails to provide them

‘Value as of the effective date of the plan,’ as used in paragraph (3)
and in proposed 11 U.S.C. § 1179(a)(7)(B) [sic], 1129(a)(9),
1129(b), 1172(2) [sic], 1325(a)(4), 1325(a)(5)(B), and 1328(b),
indicated that the promised payment under the plan must be
discounted to present value as of the effective date of the plan. The
discounting should be based only on the unpaid balance of the
amount due under the plan, until that amount, including interest, is
paid in full. Id. at 6364.
34.
35.

See Maloy, supra note 32, at 21–25.
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988) (“Under
current law, no Chapter 11 reorganization plan can be confirmed over the creditors’
legitimate objections (absent certain conditions not relevant here) if it fails to comply
with the absolute priority rule.”).
36. Id. at 208 (reasoning that “there may still be some value in the control of the
enterprise . . .”).
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adequate protection or fails to honor the absolute priority rule.”37 The
Court later cited this language in Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, decided in
1999.38 There, the Court held that prepetition owners may not cram
down a plan that allows only those owners to contribute new capital in
exchange for equity in the reorganized debtor where the dissenting class
of creditors was not paid in full.39 In 203 North LaSalle, the Court
further communicated a preference for market valuations rather than
judicial ones. It opined that Congress intended to “narrow the occasions
for courts to make valuation judgments” and implied a “disfavor for
decisions untested by competitive choice” under section
1129(b)(2)(B),40 which governs the cramdown of unsecured claims. A
test by the market—specifically, by giving creditors the right to
participate through submitting bids or proposing competing plans—
satisfies the absolute priority rule by ensuring that “top dollar” is paid.41
Thus, less than five years prior to deciding the Tills’ consumer
bankruptcy case, the Court was firmly wedded to maintaining the
absolute priority rule in chapter 11 cases.
B. CRAMDOWN UNDER SECTION 1325
In order for a plan to be confirmed under chapter 13, it must
comply with general confirmation requirements similar to those in
chapter 11. Such requirements, like section 1129, include a court finding
that either (1) all classes of creditors have accepted the plan or (2) if a
class dissents, the plan satisfies specific criteria. In the case of a secured
creditor, those criteria are that the plan must provide that either (1) the
debtor surrenders the collateral to the claimholder or (2) the claimholder
retains its lien and “the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not
less than the allowed amount of such claim.”42 Thus, cramdown in
37.
38.

Id. at 207.
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S.
434, 457 (1999).
39. Id. at 437.
40. Id. at 457–58. The Court held that promoting market valuations is in the
interest of “statutory coherence” with other sections of the Code; specifically, it renders
§ 1129(b)(2)(B) consistent with the “supramajoritarian class creditor voting scheme” of
§ 1126(c). Id.
41. Id. at 457.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2012).
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chapter 13 requires a “present value” test (hereinafter referred to as the
“chapter 13 present value test”) that is facially similar to the chapter 11
present value test.43 However, section 1325(a)(5) makes no reference to
the “fair and equitable” requirement, a distinction that has gone largely
unrecognized by courts considering the relevance of Till to chapter 11
cases, as we discuss further in Part IV.
Before Till was decided, the circuit courts adopted various methods
of calculating the discount rate applicable to the chapter 13 present
value test. These methods included the “coerced loan” approach44
(adoption of market rates for similar loans); the “presumptive contract
rate” approach45 (adoption of the prepetition contract rate as a
presumption that either party may refute with evidence); “the cost of
funds” approach46 (adoption of the rate that it would cost the lender to
obtain an equal amount of money, i.e., the lender’s cost of funds); and
various formula approaches47 (adoption of a relatively riskless rate—like
the US Treasury rate—and the addition of a risk premium, such as for
default risk). In 2004, the Supreme Court’s decision in Till eliminated
the debate over interest rates in chapter 13 cramdown fights and
mandated use of the “prime-plus” method, a formula approach involving
43. Section 1325 differs in requiring (1) assessment of the value of the “property”
to be distributed, whereas § 1129 specifically requires “deferred payments,” and (2) the
present value of the property be “not less than” the “allowed amount of the claim,”
whereas § 1129 requires that the present value of the deferred payments be “at least”
the value of the collateral securing the claim. Compare id., with 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). Further, the tests are not identical in practice because experts are
not typically retained in chapter 13 bankruptcies given the small sums at stake.
44. Six circuits adopted variations of the “coerced loan” approach. See, e.g., In re
Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999
F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1993); United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126 (4th Cir. 1993); In
re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925 (6th
Cir. 1989); In re S. States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983).
45. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Till v. SCS Credit
Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (holding the original contract rate should serve as the
“presumptive rate” for cramdown).
46. Id. at 593 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
47. Three circuits adopted alternative “formula” methods for discounting payments
to present value. See In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated by
Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997) (holding chapter 13 cramdown
interest should be fixed at the treasury bond rate plus a 1-3% risk premium); In re
Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1990) (approving formula approach for chapter 12
cramdown); United States v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir. 1989) (endorsing
formula approach in determining chapter 12 cramdown interest).
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adoption of the prime rate plus a risk variable that typically is, but need
not be, within the range of one to three percent.48
III. A “DEEP DIVE” INTO TILL v. SCS CREDIT CORP.
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The bankruptcy case of Lee and Amy Till was in most respects an
ordinary consumer bankruptcy. In 1998, Instant Auto Finance, a
subprime auto lender, financed the Tills’ purchase of a used 1991
Chevrolet pickup truck at a 21% annual interest rate,49 the maximum
rate chargeable under Indiana’s usury law.50 The loan was for $6,426,
and the bimonthly payments were to be $122.51 In 1999, the Tills, who
had reduced the principal by about 25% but were in default, filed for
chapter 13 relief in bankruptcy court for the Southern District of
Indiana.52 The parties stipulated to a $4,000 secured claim for the
lender.53
The Tills’ plan proposed to repay the secured claim in full over 17
months at a 9.5% interest rate at a time when the “prime” rate was
around 8%.54 The 1.5% premium was set by local rule (a fact not

48. Till, 541 U.S. at 466 (“The risk adjustment’s proper scale is not before this
Court. The Bankruptcy Court approved 1.5% in this case, and other courts have
generally approved 1% to 3%.”).
49. Brief for Respondent at 1, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016), 2003 WL
22466039.
50. Id. at 31 (citing Ind. Code Ann. § 24-4.5-3-201).
51. Till, 541 U.S. at 470 (“Petitioners’ initial indebtedness amounted to $8,285.24–
the $6,425.75 balance of the truck purchase plus a finance charge of 21% per year for
136 weeks, or $1,859.49. Under the contract, petitioners agreed to make 68 biweekly
payments to cover this debt . . . .”).
52. See Brief for Respondent, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016); Brief for
Petitioners at 3, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). The lender also received an $895
deficiency claim which was not satisfied in full. See id. This is worth keeping in mind
to the extent one wants to think about whether the Tills’ plan was “fair” or “equitable”
in a broad sense, especially when advocates of greater debtor relief emphasize the 21%
pre-petition interest rate and the supposed profit reaped by the lender. The lender here
was not paid in full on its total claim.
53. Till, 541 U.S. at 470.
54. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016); Brief for
Respondent at 5, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016).
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disclosed in any of the Court’s opinions).55 The lender voted to reject the
proposed treatment and, at the confirmation hearing, showed through
two fact witnesses that (1) it “uniformly” charged a 21% interest rate on
loans of similar credit quality and purpose and (2) such a rate was the
prevailing industry rate for car loans to creditors like the Tills56 (none of
which was surprising given that 21% was the usury ceiling57).
The Tills responded with expert testimony to the effect that a fair
market price of capital and the time value of money were captured by
the prime rate of 8% interest, and a 1.5% risk premium should be added
to cover the risk that petitioners would not make payments as required
by the plan.58 The resultant 9.5% rate dovetailed with the rate
established by local rule. The expert asserted that this 9.5% formula rate
was “very reasonable” given that chapter 13 plans are “supposed to be
financially feasible” and opined that respondent’s exposure was fairly
limited because chapter 13 plans are performed “under the supervision
of the court.”59 The chapter 13 trustee filed comments supporting the
formula rate as, “among other things, easily ascertainable, closely tied to
the ‘condition of the financial market,’ and independent of the financial
circumstances of any particular lender.”60 The bankruptcy judge allowed
the debtors’ expert’s testimony, adopted his reasoning, and confirmed
the plan in an unreported opinion in June 2000.61

55. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016), 2003
WL 22955931. This is surprising given that the plurality would go on to declare that the
“prime-plus” approach provided room for individualized risk assessment.
56. Till, 541 U.S. at 471.
57. Brief for Respondent at 31, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016) (citing Ind. Code
Ann. § 24-4.5-3-201).
58. The expert was an Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
economics professor who “acknowledged that he had only limited familiarity with the
subprime auto lending market.” Till, 541 U.S. at 471. Paying an academic expert to
deliver expert testimony is unusual in Chapter 13, especially where the amount in
controversy is less than $1,000. Here, the UAW was representing the Tills and bore the
cost of the expert outside of the estate. Correspondence between Annette Rush, attorney
for United Auto Worker Legal Services Plan, and Mark J. Thompson (Jan. 6, 2014) (on
file with authors). On a $4,000 note over 17 months, the 11.5% difference in interest
rates amounted to about $600 in additional payments.
59. Till, 541 U.S. at 471–72.
60. Id. at 472 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a-42a).
61. Brief for Petitioners at 1, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016); see Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at Appendix D, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016).
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The lender appealed to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, which reversed on the grounds that
unrebutted evidence established that a subprime market existed with
rates of 21%, and therefore the contract rate should be utilized.62
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in August 2002, by 2 to 1, but did so
on different grounds than the opinion below.63 Its opinion echoed the
district court in reasoning that a secured creditor “is entitled to the rate
of interest it could have obtained had it foreclosed and reinvested the
proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk” to a similarly situated
debtor since nothing less would give the creditor the “indubitable
equivalent” of its nonbankruptcy entitlement.64 However, the Seventh
Circuit went further, announcing that the pre-petition non-default
contract rate was presumptive evidence of the correct rate,65 thus
endorsing the “presumptive contract rate” approach. The lone dissenter
advocated reimbursing the lender only for its “cost of funds,” an
approach she touted as “closer to recognizing the economic
consequences of the debtor’s decision to keep the collateral.”66 After
denying writs of certiorari in similar disputes, the Supreme Court chose
Till as the vehicle to resolve the circuit split.
Ultimately, in Till, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
decision below, endorsing the formula approach and ordering
application of the “prime-plus” method. It rejected the presumptive
contract rate approach in a 5-4 decision that comprised three camps. A
62. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). The District Court
considered this to answer the controlling inquiry under Koopmans v. Farm Credit
Servs. Of Mid-Am., 102 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 1996). See also In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 586
(7th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Till, 541 U.S. 465. The Seventh Circuit explained that
its decision in Koopmans stood for the proposition that “the creditor must get the
market rate of interest, at the time of the hypothetical foreclosure, for loans of
equivalent duration and risk.” In re Till, 301 F.3d at 591 (quoting Koopmans, 102 F.3d
at 875).
63. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 593.
64. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 591-92.
65. See id. at 592 (stating that the “old contract rate will yield a rate sufficiently
reflective of the value of the collateral at the time of the effectiveness of the plan to
serve as a presumptive rate”) (adopting the reasoning of General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1993) and In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
66. Id. at 595 (Rovner, J., dissenting). This analysis is neither legally sound nor
accurately reflects the basic principles of finance in a market economy. The fact that a
risk has materialized has nothing to do with whether the government can coercively reexpose the lender to a renewal of that risk or a different one, or at what price.
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plurality, supporting the “prime-plus” method, narrowly prevailed in an
opinion authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Breyer,
Ginsberg, and Souter. Justice Thomas authored a separate concurrence
that advocated use of the risk-free rate because it is “[t]he interest rate
most closely approximating the riskless or pure rate for money.”67
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Rehnquist joined a dissent written by
Justice Scalia that argued for use of the “presumptive contract” rate, a
variation of the “coerced loan” approach.68 The lack of a clear majority
view suggests the Till prime-plus method should have had weak
precedential effect, especially outside of chapter 13 cramdowns, but this
has not been the case.69
B. THE TILL DICTA
The plurality included two dicta that, some argue, bear on the
chapter 11 present value test. First, the Till plurality stated: “We think it
likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow
essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate
under any of these provisions.”70 This “same approach” dictum was
followed by the comment that Congress would favor an approach
“familiar in the financial community” and that “minimizes the need for
expensive evidentiary proceedings.” The comment was the first in a list
67.
68.
69.

Till, 541 U.S. at 488 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 490–508 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
It bears noting that eight of the nine justices did agree that the rate should be
higher than the prime rate (the plurality having endorsed the prime-plus approach and
the dissent having endorsed the coerced loan approach). See also Daniel R. Wong, Note
and Comment, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns: Adopting a Contract Rate
Approach, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1927, 1945 (2012) (citing Till, 541 U.S. at 477). Wong
opines that “[t]he narrowest interpretation [of the holding of Till] is that the Supreme
Court did not endorse the coerced loan approach for Chapter 13 debtors.” Id. Where no
single rationale explains the decision of the majority of the court, “the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)) (Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ., plurality). In Till, a majority of the justices (the plurality and Justice
Thomas) agreed to reject of the presumptive contract rate approach in the Chapter 13
case before them, but only four of the nine justices (the plurality) endorsed the primeplus approach as an alternative.
70. Till, 541 U.S. at 474, 474 n.10 (referencing 11 U. S. C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii)
(2012), which requires payment of property with a “value, as of the effective date of the
plan” equals or exceeds the value of the creditor’s claim, and other related sections).
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of three considerations said to govern how to choose an interest rate
“sufficient to compensate the creditor” for concerns that accompany
future payments under section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).71 The second
consideration in the list was that “Chapter 13 expressly authorizes a
bankruptcy court to modify the rights of any creditor whose claim is
secured by an interest in anything other than real property that is the
debtor’s principal residence.”72 The third was that the calculation should
be “objective” rather than subjective “from the point of view of the
creditor.”73
In its discussion of this third point regarding the need for an
“objective” calculation method, the plurality opinion included a
footnote, “Footnote 14,” that stated: “when picking a cramdown rate in a
chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an efficient market
would produce.”74 Footnote 14 made this assertion after explaining that
“there is no free market of willing cram down lenders” (presumably, in
chapter 13 bankruptcies).75 Contrasting this observation with its
perception of chapter 11 practice, the court noted that, in chapter 11,
there exist lender advertisements offering debtor-in-possession financing
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 475 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)).
Id. at 476.
Id. at 476 n.14. The full text of Footnote 14 is as follows:
This fact helps to explain why there is no readily apparent Chapter
13 “cram down market rate of interest”: Because every cramdown
loan is imposed by a court over the objection of the secured creditor,
there is no free market of willing cramdown lenders. Interestingly,
the same is not true in the Chapter 11 context, as numerous lenders
advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in possession. See, e.g.,
Balmoral Financial Corporation, http://www.balmoral.com/bdip.htm
(all Internet materials as visited Mar. 4, 2004, and available in Clerk
of Court’s case file) (advertising debtor in possession lending);
Debtor in Possession Financing: 1st National Assistance Finance
Association DIP Division, http://www.loanmallusa.com/dip.htm
(offering “to tailor a financing program . . . to your business needs
and . . . to work closely with your bankruptcy counsel). Thus, when
picking a cramdown rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense
to ask what rate an efficient market would produce. In the Chapter
13 context, by contrast, the absence of any such market obligates
courts to look to first principles and ask only what rate will fairly
compensate a creditor for its exposure.

75.

Id.
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to debtors.76 After making the key assertion that looking to market rates
might make sense in a chapter 11 case, the plurality concluded the
footnote by contrasting chapter 13, in which “the absence of any such
market obligates courts to look to first principles and ask only what rate
will fairly compensate a creditor for its exposure.”77 Both Till dicta—the
“same approach” remark and Footnote 14—have influenced cramdowns
outside of the chapter 13 consumer context, as discussed in Part IV.
C. TILL: A PRAGMATIC CHAPTER 13 DECISION
Till was a chapter 13 bankruptcy case that was likely unintended to
overrule the Court’s past century of precedent upholding the application
of the absolute priority doctrine in business reorganizations, from Boyd
to 203 North LaSalle, none of which received a mention in the
plurality’s opinion. This reading of the case is supported by a close
review not only of the opinion, but also the briefs submitted to and
arguments before the Court. First, there was negligible consideration, in
either briefing or oral argument, of chapter 11 statutory parallels to
chapter 13 cramdown issues. Second, significant portions of the briefing
and oral argument centered on an issue specific to consumer bankruptcy
cases—subprime lending—which has little bearing on chapter 11
business reorganizations. Finally, the Court, as evidenced at oral
argument, was focused predominantly on the administrative concern of
how the various present value calculation methods would operate in
practice in the chapter 13 environment without any regard for the
implications of such methods in chapter 11. These factors suggest that
Till’s dicta should not be afforded significant weight outside of chapter
13 cases.
1. Negligible Consideration of Chapter 11 Statutory Parallels
In their submissions to the Supreme Court, the parties’ arguments
dwelled on the pragmatic aspects of chapter 13 cases. The debtors’
briefing barely discussed the language of the Bankruptcy Code or preCode law. The debtors contrasted chapters 11 and 13 only once, in a
footnote in their reply brief highlighting only differences between the
76. Id. (as opposed to exit financing, which is more akin to chapter 11 cramdown
payments).
77. Id.
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two chapters. They argued that the “complexity of assets” and “variety
of risks” typical of chapter 11 bankruptcies “make the present value
analysis as part of the ‘fair and equitable’ standard under Chapter 11 a
complex endeavor beyond the scope of consumer chapter 13.”78 The rest
of the debtors’ brief underscored chapter 13’s purpose and how chapter
13 operates in practice.
The lender’s brief devoted less than three pages to business
reorganization parallels.79 It argued that Congress intended for section
1325 to be construed within the confines of the “indubitable
equivalence” standard of In re Murel Holding Co., a business
reorganization case.80 However, the lender failed to provide authority for
that thesis, and it did not address the critical textual distinction81
between sections 1129 and 1325 that plainly contradicts the lender’s
argument.82 In contrast (and correctly83), the amicus brief for the United
States, submitted by the Solicitor General, highlighted some of the
textual differences between the cramdown provisions in chapters 11 and
13. Notably, the Solicitor General emphasized that the “indubitable
equivalence” standard does not appear in section 1325.84 The brief
stated:
The statutory term “indubitable equivalent,” however,
appears only in two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
neither of which applies here. See 11 U.S.C. 361(3) . . .
11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (prescribing an “indubitable
equivalent” standard as an alternative to cram down in
Chapter 11 proceedings) . . . . Disputes over present
value and discount rates concern how courts should
calculate that equivalence. Language quoted from

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1 n.1, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016).
See Brief for Respondent at 41–43, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016).
In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1941).
See infra Part V.A.
Brief for Respondent at 41–43, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016) (citing only to
authority treating chapter 11 and failing to rationalize its extension of the “indubitable
equivalence” concept to chapter 13 cases). Lender also spent most of its brief on topics
other than language, arguing principally that market rates and contract rates are the best
evidence of risk, and discounting to present value should be done on a risk-adjusted
basis.
83. See infra Part V.A.
84. Brief for the United States at 18, n.9, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016), 2003
WL 22070345.
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Sections 361(3) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) does not in any
way answer that question.85
In short, the Solicitor General made the point that chapter 11
standards do not necessarily inform chapter 13 cramdowns.
Consistent with the parties’ and Solicitor General’s briefs, the oral
argument gave minimal consideration to chapter 11 cramdown
principles as authorities (or even as analogies) for interpreting section
1325(a)(5)(B). The Court’s interrogation of the Tills’ counsel centered
on chapter 13 debtors’ risks of default, including statistics relating to
such defaults and means of calculating a risk premium. During argument
by lender’s counsel, Justice Breyer brushed aside discussion of
“indubitable equivalence”86 and changed the focus of the argument to
the “practical question” before the Court. Likewise, when lender’s
counsel compared how interest rates are generated in chapter 11 and 13
cases, attempting to answer the question of the best evidence of a market
rate, Justice Breyer dismissively retorted, “Tell me . . . a question I don’t
know the answer to”87 and again redirected the discussion to a practical
concern: what would happen if a chapter 13 debtor defaulted under the
plan. In her rebuttal, counsel for the Tills closed her oral argument with
the succinct statement that “indubitable equivalence is not a chapter 13
concept.”88 Overall, oral argument focused on the practical challenges of
determining a rate in a chapter 13 case rather than on concepts like
“indubitable equivalence” and “fair and equitable,” which are integral to
chapter 11 cramdowns. Mirroring this concentration on chapter 13
practicalities rather than on chapter 11 standards, the plurality opinion
did not conduct an in-depth review of case law or the statutory text, as
might be expected in a litigation turning on statutory interpretation. The
business reorganization standard invoked by the lender—”indubitable

85. Id. at 18 n.9 (emphasis added). Although the paragraph begins as a response to
the lender’s invocation of “indubitable equivalence,” the 1129 reference that closes the
point is not to the clause that contains the phrase “indubitable equivalence” (clause (iii))
but to the “deferred cash payment” test two clauses earlier in the statute.
86. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016) (stating
that “nobody is disagreeing” that the concept of indubitable equivalence is
compensatory).
87. Id. at 41–42.
88. Id. at 55.
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equivalence”—was not mentioned at all in any of the opinions issued by
the Supreme Court.89
2. Focus on Subprime Lending in Chapter 13
A second issue emphasized in the briefing and argument was
subprime auto lending, the challenges of which are only relevant to
consumer credit.90 The debtors’ brief emphasized the supposedly
egregious pricing practices associated with subprime auto loans,91 a
subset of subprime consumer lending wherein interest rates are often
capped by state usury laws. Usury rates tend not to fluctuate with the
market. They are maximum rates that a lender may charge a consumer
borrower, who typically has weak bargaining power or choice of
financing packages.92
The inflexibility of the usury rate was a key issue during oral
argument. Justice Breyer seemed especially perturbed. He expressed
concern that a “presumptive contract rate” approach would not adjust to
match changes in credit market rates that were relevant to a present
value computation. He observed that interest rates had fallen in the years
between the Tills’ truck purchase and confirmation of their plan, but the
contract rate approach would not pass the benefit of that reduction
through to the Tills nor adjust their interest rate to reflect the presumed
rehabilitation of their finances in chapter 13.93 The lender’s counsel
89.
90.

See Till, 541 U.S. 465.
Subprime lending is “extending consumer credit to individuals with incomplete
or somewhat tarnished credit records who often are unable to obtain traditional
financing.” Joseph A. Smith, Jr., ‘The Federal Banking Agencies’ Guidance on
Subprime Lending: Regulation with A Divided Mind,” 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 73, 76
(2002).
91. The brief included a description of subprime auto lending, stating “the higher
interest rates charged by subprime lenders cannot be fully explained solely as a function
of the ‘additional risks’ presented by these loans.” See Brief for Petitioners at 17, Till,
541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016).
92. See Smith, supra note 90, at 76, for general discussions of subprime lending.
Such characteristics make the subprime borrower susceptible to exploitation by lenders.
The Solicitor General’s brief communicated a disdain for “eye-popping” interest rates.
Brief for the United States at 6, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). This sentiment was
echoed by the plurality. Till, 541 U.S. at 480-81.
93. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-29, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 021016). Justice Breyer questioning, in relevant part:
MR. BRUNSTAD: Your Honor, the contract rate is the best
evidence, the single best evidence of the market rate.
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explained that the market rate was capped by state usury law.94 The
plurality, of which Justice Breyer was a member, wound up presenting
the “prime-plus” formula approach as a self-adjusting “market”
approach in contrast to the contract rate presumption. The plurality
favored the “prime-plus” rate because it “depends only on the state of
financial markets, the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the
characteristics of the loan, not on the creditor’s circumstances or its
prior interactions with the debtor.”95 At the same time, the plurality
conceptualized the subprime contract market as inappropriately rigid,
opining that “several considerations suggest that the subprime market is
not, in fact, perfectly competitive.”96

QUESTION: Contract rate—if there has to be a number that’s
wrong, it has to be that one. . . . The contract rate by definition was
entered into at some significant period of time prior to the present,
and the present, by chance in this instance, is 2 years later, and we
know that interest rates fell at least 1 or 2 percent during that time.
MR. BRUNSTAD: But not for subprime—
QUESTION: So—what?
MR. BRUNSTAD: But not for subprime loans.
QUESTION: That’s impossible. The prime rate—
MR. BRUNSTAD: No, Your Honor. This is why.
QUESTION: If that’s so, then the risk went up.
MR. BRUNSTAD: No, that’s not correct, Your Honor, and this is
why.
QUESTION: No. It isn’t?
MR. BRUNSTAD: Because State law caps the maximum rate that
can be paid.
QUESTION: Oh, okay. . . . All right, because it’s a usury problem.
MR. BRUNSTAD: Correct.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Till, 541 U.S., at 466.
Id. at 481-82 (stating that “several considerations suggest that the subprime
market is not, in fact, perfectly competitive. To begin with, used vehicles are regularly
sold by means of tie-in transactions, in which the price of the vehicle is the subject of
negotiation, while the terms of the financing are dictated by the seller. In addition, there
is extensive federal and state regulation of subprime lending, which not only itself
distorts the market, but also evinces regulators’ belief that unregulated subprime lenders
would exploit borrowers’ ignorance and charge rates above what a competitive market
would allow.”).
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3. Focus on Ease of Administration of Chapter 13 Cases
Oral argument addressed ease of administration more than any
other topic. A traditional examination of statutory text and case law
precedents was conspicuously absent. Early in the oral argument, Justice
Kennedy described the coerced loan theory as “hard to administer” and
questioned whether the “prime-plus” approach might present a similar
challenge.97 The justices repeatedly asked counsel—and each other—
one practical question: whether it made more sense to calculate the
cramdown rate by starting with a floor, like the prime rate, and work
upward for increased risk, or by starting with the contract rate, which
presumably reflects risk, and adjusting downward to reflect the
supposed benefits to lenders of chapter 13 administration (such as the
presence of a plan trustee and court supervision of plan performance).
When the Solicitor General was questioned about the wisdom of starting
with the prime rate and working up from it, he countered with the
observation that in this case the search is for an easily calculable proxy
rather than a perfect rate, explaining that “there is no rate you can find
that—that precisely reflects the unique mix of risks and benefits and
protections that are available under the Bankruptcy Code. And so by
definition, everyone here is talking about a proxy in some form or
another.”98 Justice Scalia, who authored the dissent, epitomized the
focus of the debate on practical concerns by asking during argument, “Is
it possible that the statute does not provide an answer to this question?
That since both of these schemes, your proposal and the other side’s
proposal, are theoretically perfect, if they are done correctly, the
bankruptcy court is free to use either one so long as he comes up with
the right answer . . . . I think what we’re trying to get to—it’s a practical
question.”99 While Justice Scalia elicited laughter from the gallery by
suggesting that perhaps “the statute does not provide an answer to this
question,”100 the plurality opinion admitted the point: “[t]he Bankruptcy
Code provides little guidance . . .” as to which method to choose.101
The Justices directed the balance of their questions toward other
practical concerns specific to chapter 13 cases. Justice Ginsburg
highlighted these by noting that “[m]ost of these debtors are very small

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 38–40 (emphasis added).
Id. at 38–39.
Till, 541 U.S. at 473.
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debtors.”102 She noted that, under such circumstances, starting with the
contract rate as a presumptive rate and requiring the debtor to argue for
downward adjustments to offset factors like the high replacement cost of
collateral, compensation for risk embedded in the contract rate, and the
transaction cost saved would be too burdensome on an individual
debtor. 103 She went on to explain that,
. . . the debtor has no money at all and certainly you don’t want the
debtor’s money eaten up hiring an attorney and further depleting the
money that could go to the creditors. So it seems to me wildly
unrealistic to expect that if you say the presumptive price is the
contract price, you’re going to get a debtor who will be able to—I
mean, I was surprised, looking at this record, that this debtor got an
expert. Who paid the expert? Maybe because the union was involved
. . . isn’t it typical that these chapter 13 debtors don’t have lawyers
104
and don’t have experts?

Her question evidenced a concern that typical chapter 13 debtors
cannot afford to pay experts, so a calculation method that required one
would render proceedings increasingly complicated and prohibitively
expensive for chapter 13 debtors. Similarly, the Court asked lender’s
counsel about the advantages of chapter 13 to the creditor,105 the
difficulties of administration,106 and the attendant costs, like the need to
hire a lawyer to pursue a defaulting chapter 13 debtor in court.107
This focus on the practicalities of administering a chapter 13
bankruptcy and the specifics of the Tills’ situation carried through to the
plurality opinion. The Court rejected the “coerced loan” approach for
reasons of administration and practicality that are specific to chapter 13,
not because the text of the Code prohibits it. As the Court noted, “the
coerced loan approach requires bankruptcy courts to consider evidence
about the market for comparable loans to similar (though nonbankrupt)
debtors, an inquiry far removed from such courts’ usual task of
evaluating debtors’ financial circumstances and the feasibility of their

102.
103.
104.
105.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016).
Id.
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 37 (such as the existence of a wage order and replacement value as
opposed to foreclosure value due to Rash).
106. Id. at 47.
107. Id. at 42–43.
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debt adjustment plans.”108 This rationale is inapplicable to a chapter 11
context where courts necessarily and routinely receive expert testimony
concerning financial markets in valuing the debtor’s business or related
valuation questions. The plurality also charged—regrettably, without
further explanation or any citations—that the “coerced loan” approach
“overcompensates creditors because the market lending rate must be
high enough to cover factors, like lenders’ transaction costs and overall
profits, that are no longer relevant in the context of court-administered
and court-supervised cram down loans.”109 This reason for rejecting the
“coerced loan” approach is inapplicable to the chapter 11 context,
where, after the effective date of the plan, the reorganized debtor
proceeds without any court supervision, trustee administration, or wage
garnishment orders, which are among those benefits ostensibly afforded
to lenders under chapter 13.
The plurality likewise rejected the “presumptive contract rate” and
“cost of funds” approaches, concluding that those methods were less
“objective” because they focused on something other than the debtor’s
proposed payment stream.110 Similarly, the plurality recognized that
those methods imposed evidentiary burdens on chapter 13 debtors who
generally could not afford to bear them and would therefore be unfairly
disadvantaged at trial.111 Such a concern does not typically arise in
chapter 11. If a chapter 11 debtor’s business is sufficiently viable to
discuss multi-year repayment terms, that almost invariably means
operation of the business during the chapter 11 case has generated
sufficient funds to cover the fees of counsel and often a valuation expert
or financial advisor. Indeed, to confirm a chapter 11 plan at all, the
debtor must show the court it can pay all such administration
expenses.112
Conversely, the plurality found that the “prime-plus” formula “has
none of [the other methods’] defects.”113 It stated that the “prime-plus”
approach takes “its cue from ordinary lending practices” because it starts
with the “prime rate,” which is in the newspaper every day.114 Once a
risk adjustment factor is added, “the resulting ‘prime plus’ rate of
108.
109.
110.
111.

Till, 541 U.S. at 477.
Id.
See id. at 479.
See id. (“[T]he formula approach . . . minimizes the need for potentially costly
additional evidentiary proceedings.”).
112. § 1129 (a)(9)(A)–(B) (2012).
113. Till, 541 U.S. at 478.
114. Id. at 478–79.
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interest depends only on the state of financial markets, the
circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the characteristics of the
loan, not on the creditor’s circumstances or its prior interactions with the
debtor. For these reasons, the prime-plus or formula rate best comports
with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”115 Justice Thomas, who
provided the fifth vote, joined the plurality because the “prime-plus”
approach came closest to his view that the correct rate be totally devoid
of any risk factor at all.116

115.
116.

Id. at 479–80.
Justice Thomas’s concurrence states that the statute requires the “property” to
be distributed under the plan to be valued rather than the debtor’s “promise” to
distribute said property. See id. at 485–487 (Thomas, J., concurring). He asserts,
without any detailed explanation of how he reaches his conclusion, that this means that
the only discounting needed is at the risk-free rate, because otherwise, the bankruptcy
court would be valuing the “promise.” See id. In other words, he assumes that only a
risk-free rate values the “property,” i.e., the cash that will be received in the future. See
id. at 486–87. While it may be correct to observe that the other justices are valuing the
debtor’s “promise to deliver property under the plan,” it can be plausibly argued that
Justice Thomas’s approach likewise values a promise. See id. at 485–90. It cannot value
“the property to be distributed under the plan” because no one at plan confirmation
knows exactly how much actually will be distributed, so even his approach values “the
property promised to be delivered under the plan.” See id. Stated differently, Justice
Thomas’s approach suggests valuing the promise at 100% probability of performance
whereas the others are assigning some lower prospect. See id. Even within the literalist
framework, one may just as easily conclude that the directive to the bankruptcy court to
value what is “to be distributed” calls for the bankruptcy court to take into account, not
merely what the plan says on paper is going to be distributed, but also the risk that what
is supposed “to be distributed” does not actually turn out to be distributed. The statute
does not explicitly say “property that is supposed to be distributed under the plan”;
rather, it just refers to what is “to be distributed.” See id. at 487 (citing 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)).
As a policy matter, if Justice Thomas’s interpretation were extended into the
chapter 11 context, companies in Chapter 11 would be entitled to turn crammed-down
debt into bonds with interest at the rate the U.S. Treasury pays on its 30-year bonds. As
a consequence, such companies would be much more likely to reduce their debt as little
as possible in the reorganization, since they could cram down the cheapest capital
possible. Moreover, it would raise the question of why Congress bothered to provide for
disclosure and voting by secured creditors in chapter 11 if a non-consensual approach
was capable of producing only a risk-free rate. Finally, since the Bankruptcy Code does
not require insolvency as a prerequisite for filing a chapter 11 case or proposing a plan,
Justice Thomas’s interpretation would invite companies to resort frequently and
liberally to chapter 11 just to re-price their debt downward in a falling rate environment.
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IV. (MIS)APPLICATIONS OF TILL IN CHAPTER 11 CRAMDOWNS
Notwithstanding the absence in Till of any endorsement of a
parallel between the chapter 13 and chapter 11 present value tests, a
number of bankruptcy decisions in Till’s wake have nonetheless
extended Till’s formula approach to chapter 11 cases.117 Some scholars
and lower courts have taken the “same approach” dictum or Footnote 14
to suggest that Till’s “prime-plus” method should determine cramdown
rates in chapter 11. In the ten years since Till was decided, a clear
consensus among the lower courts as to whether and how Till applies in
chapter 11 cramdowns has yet to form.118 Some courts decline to apply
Till,119 but those that embrace it follow one of two approaches.
A. AMERICAN HOMEPATIENT’S TWO-STEP INQUIRY
First, several courts have adopted the “two step inquiry” of the
Sixth Circuit in In re American HomePatient, Inc.120 In that case the
court construed the plurality’s Footnote 14 dictum to mean that the Till
Court’s formula approach applies to chapter 11 cramdowns when no
“efficient market” exists.121 American HomePatient elevated that dictum
117. See, e.g., In re GAC Storage Lansing, LLC, 485 B.R. 174, 193 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2013); In re Moultonborough Hotel Grp., LLC, No. 10-14214-JMD, 2012 WL
5464630, at *6–9 (Bankr. D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2012) (applying formula approach where no
efficient market exists); In re Riverbend Leasing LLC, 458 B.R. 520, 535 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa 2011) (applying formula approach where no efficient market exists); see also In re
G-I Holdings Inc., 420 B.R. 216, 239 (D.N.J. 2009) (endorsing a formula approach that
begins with LIBOR); In re Deep River Warehouse, Inc., No. 04-52749, 2005 WL
2319201 at *11–12 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2005) (endorsing a formula approach
that begins with the 10-year Treasury rate).
118. For a useful summary of the state of the law after Till, see Louis E. Robichaux
IV, Russell A. Perry, Jonathan L. Howell, Till in Chapter 11 Cases and the Looming
“Efficient Market” Debate, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (2013).
119. See, e.g., In re Linda Vista Cinemas, L.L.C., 442 B.R. 724, 749 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2010) (market approach); In re DBSD. N. Am., Inc., 419 BR 179, 209 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (preferring
contract or comparable loan approach); In re Valencia Flour Mill, Ltd., 348 B.R. 573,
578–79 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2006) (contract rate; declining Till’s prime-plus); In re WinnDixie Stores, Inc., 356 BR 239, 256 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (market rate).
120. See In re Am. HomePatient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2005).
121. Id. at 568 (“[W]e opt to take our cue from Footnote 14 of the opinion, which
offered the guiding principle that ‘when picking a cram down rate in a Chapter 11 case,
it might make sense to ask what rate an efficient market would produce.’ Till, 541 U.S.
at 476 n. 14, 124 S.Ct. 1951. This means that the market rate should be applied in
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to a rule of law: first, the court should determine whether the lending
market is “efficient”; if it is not, the court should apply Till’s “primeplus” formula.122 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has
likewise affirmed the application of Till’s “prime-plus” method in the
absence of an “efficient market,” and other courts have accepted this
method as well.123
The only other circuit court opinion addressing this issue in chapter
11 bankruptcies is In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel, L.L.C.124 In that
case, the debtor and the secured lender stipulated that Till controlled.125
The debtor’s expert argued for the prime rate plus a 1.75% risk premium
to account for “the factors enumerated by the Till plurality,” including
the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, the nature of the security,
and the feasibility of the plan.126 The creditor’s expert, in contrast,
argued for a “blended market rate” approach consisting of: first, the
prime rate plus a premium so great the resultant rate equaled the
weighted average of the rates the market would charge for an equivalent
exit financing package and, second, a discount for the circumstances of
the estate and the plan’s feasibility.127 The bankruptcy court adopted the
debtor’s proposed rate.128 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit criticized the
creditor’s approach as amounting to an effective choice of “the market
rate, and not the prime rate, as the starting point”129 contrary to the
stipulation to follow Till’s “prime-plus” formula. It then affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s adoption of the debtor’s “prime-plus” method, which
the court could not find to be “clearly erroneous” because the approach
was “endorsed by a plurality of the Supreme Court, adopted by the vast
majority of bankruptcy courts, and, perhaps most importantly, accepted
Chapter 11 cases where there exists an efficient market. But where no efficient market
exists for a Chapter 11 debtor, then the bankruptcy court should employ the formula
approach endorsed by the Till plurality. This nuanced approach should obviate the
concern of commentators who argue that, even in the Chapter 11 context, there are
instances where no efficient market exists.”).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., In re VDG Chicken, LLC, No. NV-10-1278-HKiD, 2011 WL
3299089, at *8-9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011).
124. See In re Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324 (5th
Cir. 2013).
125. Id. at 327.
126. Id. at 334.
127. See id. at 335.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 335 n.57.
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as governing by both parties.”130 Notably, the Fifth Circuit concluded its
opinion by stating that its holding should not be taken to suggest that the
“prime-plus” formula is “the only—or even the optimal—method for
calculating the chapter 11 cramdown rate.”131
The American HomePatient line of cases is flawed for two reasons.
First, bankruptcy courts have no particular competence in determining
whether markets are efficient. It is ironic that Till, which called market
analysis “an inquiry far removed from such courts’ usual task[s],”132
would be construed to instruct those same courts to engage in the kind
of market analysis usually conducted by the Department of Justice or the
Federal Trade Commission. Second, courts have inexplicably allowed
debtors to define the criterion of efficiency to be whether the debtor can
get the terms the debtor wants in the market (a “did-Santa-bring-youeverything-on-your-list” approach).133 This perversely incentivizes
debtors to propose wildly off-market loan terms, causing the market to
look inefficient and thereby inducing the judge to approve the proposed
cramdown rate based on currently low prime rates and a below-market
risk premium.
For instance, in Texas Grand Prairie, the debtor’s expert had
testified that average terms for loans to similar hotels in 2010 included a
loan-to-value ratio of 58%, an interest rate of 7.9%, and a debt-coverage
ratio (net operating income divided by debt service) of 1.5,134 none of
which came close to the terms of the proposed plan. He nonetheless
disregarded the market “because he believed that the market for hotel
and hospitality loans generally was not an efficient market,” a
conclusion which cleared the way for the debtor’s proposed cramdown
rate, which was only 5%.135
A particularly egregious example of a debtor proposing off-market
repayment terms to elicit a finding that the loan market is not efficient is

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 337.
Id.
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 (2004).
While a discussion of what is, or is not, an “efficient market” is well beyond
the scope of this article, it is safe to say that the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of a single
market participant is not considered to be a sufficient datum by which to gauge a
market’s efficiency.
134. Brief of Appellant at 18, In re Tex. Grand Prairie, 710 F.3d 324 (No. 1111109), 2012 WL 1197681.
135. Id. at 20-22.
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In re Castleton Plaza.136 There, the debtor, which owned a shopping
center, proposed a plan that left a loan-to-value ratio of approximately
97% and provided for repayment of the balance of the mortgage over 10
years based on a 30-year amortization schedule.137 The bankruptcy court
presented its “efficient market analysis” in a single sentence, stating:
“There is not an efficient market in which a loan can be obtained for
more than 97% of the value of a shopping center with an occupancy rate
of less than 70% . . . .”138 Instead of realizing the market was behaving
rationally not to lend that much against a property that was thirty percent
vacant, the court endorsed the debtor’s proposed prime-plus 3% rate.
The American HomePatient formulation of Footnote 14 defies
common sense. Instead of inferring from the fact that “the market would
not make the loan on the terms proposed” that the terms were not “fair”
and “equitable” to the creditor, American HomePatient’s “nuanced
approach” has led courts to assume that the terms are fair and equitable
and the market is simply inefficient precisely because it will not support
those terms. Thus, although a proper recognition of the depth and
efficiency of U.S. capital markets may bring the American HomePatient
approach more or less into line with the absolute priority rule, the
implementation of the approach has been seriously flawed.139 The
approach is reminiscent of the reasoning of the debtor’s expert in Till
who opined that the prime-plus rate of 9.5% was “very reasonable”
given that chapter 13 plans are “supposed to be financially feasible.”140
Such reasoning may be accepted in the chapter 13 context, but it has
never been accepted as satisfying chapter 11’s established “fair and
equitable” standard.
136. In re Castleton Plaza, LP, 707 F.3d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 2013) (vacating and
remanding confirmation order on other grounds).
137. Id. at 822. On remand, the bankruptcy judge dismissed after giving debtor
multiple opportunities to modify the plan. Order Granting EL-SNPR Notes Holdings,
LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), In re Castleton Plaza, LP,
Case No. 11-01444-BHL (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Feb. 11, 2014). The Debtor appealed to the
Seventh Circuit; the case has been fully briefed and argued as of April 22, 2015.
138. Order Confirming the Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization at 9, In re Castleton
Plaza, LP, Case No. 11-01444-BHL (Bankr. S.D. Ind. May 31, 2012).
139. While the definition of an “efficient market” is a vigorously debated and
studied topic in academics, there is absolutely zero support for a thesis that the
efficiency of a market is measured by whether one would-be participant is satisfied with
the range of offers the market affords that participant.
140. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 471-72 (2004) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).

2015]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

923

B. MOMENTIVE PERFORMANCE MATERIALS
A second, more radical approach has been to impose the “primeplus” method without any analysis of the market’s efficiency. The
decision in In re Momentive Performance Materials exemplified this
approach.141 The Momentive court declared as a “first principle” that
“the cramdown interest rate, under Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), should
not contain any profit or cost element.”142 For this proposition, the court
cited Till (which, as discussed infra, itself cited no authority for this
proposition) as well as another chapter 13 case within the Second
Circuit, In re Valenti.143 The court also addressed Footnote 14 and its
dictum that “it might make sense to look at what rate an efficient market
might produce.” The court explained that Footnote 14’s reference to
debtor-in-possession financing (the extension of funds to a debtor in
bankruptcy) betrayed a mistaken understanding of those loans and
undermined the footnote’s persuasive value. It said that “[l]oans
imposed at confirmation resemble more traditional exit or long-term
financing than interim debtor-in-possession financing,” and, given this
fact, Footnote 14 could not have been referencing cramdown loans.144
The Momentive court further concluded that other courts’ emphasis
on whether an efficient market exists is misplaced, noting that “there
clearly was some form of market… in the Till case.”145 Moreover, it
contended that the presence or absence of a perfect market was not the
driving factor of the Till Court’s decision, as evidenced by the fact that
the plurality “again referred to a perfectly competitive market.”146
Rather, according to the Momentive court, what drove the Till decision
was “an interest rate that takes the profit out, takes the fees out, and
compensates the creditor under a formula starting with a base rate, that
is essentially riskless, plus up to a 1 to 3 percent additional risk
premium, if any, at least as against the prime rate, for the debtor’s own

141. See In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, No. 14-cv-07471-vb, 2015 WL 2330761 (S.D.N.Y. May
4, 2015); see also In re G-I Holdings Inc., 420 BR 216, 267 (D.N.J. 2009) (preferring to
start with LIBOR); In re Deep River Warehouse, Inc., No. 04-52749, 2005 WL
2319201 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2005) (preferring 10-year US treasury rate).
142. In re MPM Silicones, No. 14-22503-rdd, at *26.
143. Id. at *24; In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997) does not mention chapter
11 or § 1129 at all.
144. In re MPM Silicones, No. 14-22503-rdd, at *27.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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unique risks . . . coming out of bankruptcy.”147 Thus, the Momentive
decision aptly discredits the American HomePatient approach in its
interpretation of Footnote 14’s reference to efficient markets, but it does
not go on to hold that Till does not apply to chapter 11 cases. Rather, the
Momentive decision is premised on the assertion that the chapter 13
present value test is “closely analogous to other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, including 1129(b)(2),” and it invokes the Till “same
approach” dictum to justify the analogy.148 Ultimately, the court in
Momentive used the “prime-plus” approach—the “same approach” used
in Till and Valenti—to determine the cramdown interest rate for the
secured claims.149
The Momentive court’s novel claim that profit has no place in the
chapter 11 present value test conflicts with Supreme Court decisions
upholding the absolute priority rule. For example, in Reconstruction
Finance Corp. v. Denver & Rio Grande Railway Co., the plan
confirmed by the lower court in 1943, in the midst of World War II,
awarded first lien creditors new restructured secured debt instruments
and stock amounting to 90% of the reorganized debtor’s equity; the
second liens received only the remaining 10% of the equity.150 Several
appeals were taken from confirmation by junior interests, principally
arguing that the first liens were being overcompensated. The second lien
holders’ reasoning was that the underlying business valuation had failed
to account for the “excess war profits” the railroad would reap during
the war after the effective date, 90% of which would flow to the first
lien holders through their newly-awarded common stock.151 The
147.
148.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 24 (“‘Congress likely intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow
essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any of
the many Code provisions requiring a court to discount a stream of deferred payments
back to their present dollar value.’”) (citing Till, 541 8 U.S. at 466).
149. See id. at 29. The Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court held that
Valenti, the pre-Till Second Circuit chapter 13 decision that adopted the prime-plus
approach, was controlling. Id.
150. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 502 n.6
(Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 502 n.6 (1946).
The decision was approved by the lower court, but the Circuit Court held that the
General bondholders were “reasonably justified” in rejecting the plan because, among
other reasons, “free cash in excess of operating capital needs and large earnings from
war business after the date of the plan should be for the benefit of the General
bondholders.” Id. at 531.
151.
Id. at 521.
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appellate court agreed that the secured creditors were over-compensated
by the debtor’s plan.152 In a seven to one ruling, the Supreme Court
reversed the circuit court, reinstated the confirmation of the plan, and
justified the award of “unlimited profits” to the first lien holders as
necessary to achieve full compensation under the “fair and equitable”
standard.153 In a section of the opinion titled “Cash and War Earnings,”
the Court noted that the Interstate Commerce Commission154 had
justified the plan’s departure from full cash equivalency for the first
liens by the fact that the senior secured bondholders would receive 90%
of the common stock and thereby participate in the “excess war
profits.”155 The Supreme Court wrote that “the error of the Circuit
Court . . . lies in its assumption that the senior bondholders were paid in
full by the securities allotted to them without also accepting the
determination of the Commission . . . [that] all subsequent earnings were
a part also of the common stock that was awarded the senior
bondholders,”156 and the “fair and equitable” principle entitled the
creditors to potentially “unlimited dividends that might be earned and
paid on the common stock to have a part in the ‘lush years.’”157

152. Id. at 520. The Circuit Court of Appeals had stated: “The senior bondholders
were paid in full. They received all the new securities and most of the common stock.
Ninety percent of the General Bondholders’ claims were wiped out. They received only
a small amount of common stock, ten per cent of their total claim. . . . We think any
plan which fails to take this [buildup of huge retained earnings during WWII] into
account and which gives the Senior Bondholders their claims in full by substantially
delivering the road to them, and gives them the surplus cash actually on hand and
further enables them to receive in addition the excess war profits which are reasonably
sure to come, is inherently inequitable and unfair, so long as there are classes of
creditors whose claims are not fully satisfied.” Id. at 520–21. Such reasoning is much
the same as that deployed by the plurality in Till and by lower courts like the Second
Circuit in Valenti, each of which concluded that creditors are “overcompensated” if
they make a profit.
153. See id. at 533 (“The grounds accepted by us in former sections of this opinion
as sustaining, as of January 1, 1943, the valuation of the road, the allocation of the
securities, and the treatment of cash, war earnings and capital reductions establish that
for the act of confirmation on November 29, 1944, over the objection of the General
bondholders, the finding of the judge that the plan then made ‘adequate provision for
fair and equitable treatment’ of the dissenters was justified.”).
154. The Interstate Commerce Commission was a regulatory agency created by
Congress to regulate railroads’ compliance with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.
155. Id. at 520–21.
156. Id. at 523–24.
157. Id. at 518.
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In a follow-up case the next year, the Court succinctly summarized
its holding:
To justify the change of position of creditors from fully secured to
partially secured, creditors were given opportunities to participate in
profits through common stock ownership with a chance at larger
earnings than the Commission’s forecast anticipated. We held the
158
priority rule was satisfied by this type of allocation.

In that second case, Insurance Group Committee v. Denver &
R.G.W.R. Co., the issue posed to the Court was remarkably similar to the
one the Tills would present nearly 60 years later: whether the secured
creditors would receive interest rates that were simply too high to be
“fair and equitable.” In contrast with the Till Court’s rejection of market
inquiries in chapter 13 cases, the 1947 Court—in the business
reorganization context—had the opposite perspective. It cited bond
market data from Moody’s showing that the first lien bonds had traded
in the 102.89 to 103.82 range during 1945 and 1946 but, in 1947, had
traded below 90. The Court concluded that “[u]ntil it can be contended
with some show of reasonableness that the [senior creditors] have
received more in value than the face of their claims, the debtor’s
insistence on a re-examination of the plan is without substantial
support.”159 In short, the Court in both Reconstruction Finance Corp.
and Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. recognized
that secured creditors may receive potentially unlimited profits in order
to satisfy the “fair and equitable” standard, and market evidence is
certainly relevant to evaluating whether packages of securities satisfy
the “fair and equitable” standard.
This was the understanding when the Bankruptcy Code was
adopted in 1978. The House Judiciary Committee staff member who led
its drafting wrote that “[t]he discount rate is equivalent to the rate of
interest that would be paid on an obligation of the debtor considering a
market rate of interest that reflects the risk of the debtor’s business.”160
In giving a numerical example of the computation, he employed
illustrative discount rates of 20% and 25%—at a time when the risk-free

158. Ins. Grp. Comm. v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 329 U.S. 607, 617 (1947)
(emphasis added).
159. Id. at 588 (citations omitted).
160. See Klee, supra note 28, at 158.
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rate was roughly half of those rates.161 Similarly, Momentive makes no
mention of 203 North LaSalle, even though that case construed the
chapter 11 provision in question just five years before Till and posited
that a “market test” should be conducted before an equity contribution
from existing owners would satisfy the “fair and equitable” requirement.
Thus, the assertion in Momentive that profit has no place in
calculating chapter 11 cramdown rates contravenes the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on this very point. Neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has plausibly indicated that chapter 11 cramdown rates should be
stripped of the profit element. Both the American HomePatient and
Momentive lines of cases conflict with the century-old line of Supreme
Court precedents in the business reorganization context requiring,
pursuant to the “fair and equitable” requirement, that secured creditors
recover payment in full before junior constituencies participate in the
reorganization. We doubt that the two casual remarks of the plurality
that have been seized upon by lower courts (Footnote 14 and the “same
approach” remark) were intended to overrule those precedents,
especially in the absence of any briefing, argument, or explanation on
the record to that effect.
V. COURTS SHOULD ANALYZE CHAPTER 11 CRAMDOWN RATES BASED
ON SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN BUSINESS REORGANIZATION
CASES
Having walked through the briefs, argument, and plurality opinion
of Till, and having examined the two groups of lower court decisions
adopting it in chapter 11, we circle back to this article’s starting point.
The phrase “fair and equitable”––judicially developed over the past
century in at least half a dozen Supreme Court opinions and codified
with its attendant judicial gloss in section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code –– requires that senior creditors be paid in full, or “made whole,”
with due regard for the evidentiary value of market information and
without a moralistic bias against profit-making. In contrast, the phrase
“fair and equitable” is absent from chapter 13 jurisprudence because the
phrase “fair and equitable” simply does not appear anywhere in chapter
13. The absence of this concept renders present value approaches
for cramdown purposes qualitatively different in chapter 13 versus
chapter 11.

161.

Id. at 158–59.
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A. CHAPTER 11 VERSUS CHAPTER 13: THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
DIFFERS MEANINGFULLY
Lower courts applying Till have failed to appreciate the differences
between sections 1129 and 1325. Specifically, they have failed to
recognize that the former expressly incorporates the “fair and equitable”
standard and the latter utterly omits it. Even though section 1129’s
“deferred payment” condition and section 1325’s “deferred payment”
condition each require very similar present value tests, the statutory
contexts in which each present value test resides have meaningful
differences.
The chapter 11 present value test appears in a clause that is
subordinate to the well-developed phrase “fair and equitable.”
1129(b)(2) states:
For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair
and equitable with respect to a class includes the following
requirements:
(A)With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides—
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens
securing such claims, whether the property subject to such
liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another
entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims;
and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on
account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at
least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such
162
holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.

The condition that a plan be “fair and equitable” “includes,” as one
of three alternatives, that a secured claimholder receive deferred cash
payments.163 The implication of Congress’s use of the word “includes”
is that “technical compliance with the requirements of section
1129(b)(2) will not insure that a plan will be crammed down if it is
unfair and inequitable for some other reason,” such as that senior

162.
163.

11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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creditors are not paid in full while junior creditors receive value.164 In
other words, the statute does not limit assessment of what is “fair and
equitable” to only those criteria explicitly listed in the Code; other
considerations, including those treated by existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence, must likewise be assessed under the current Code.
The statute commands that the plan’s treatment of a dissenting class
must be “fair and equitable,” and it is merely a subordinate clause that
allows deferred cash payments to be used as long as they deliver full
present value. The conscious choice to locate “fair and equitable” in the
main clause, especially in light of Los Angeles Lumber’s express
declaration that the incorporation of the phrase in prior laws endorsed
the Supreme Court’s interpretations of it,165 signals that Congress
intended the well-developed standard to govern the application of the
subordinate clauses. A contrary conclusion would be inconsistent with
the dominant/subordinate relationship and would effectively read the
phrase, and its century of judicial affirmation, out of the Code. Had
Congress wanted to free plans of reorganization from the absolute
priority standard, it would have simply omitted “fair and equitable”
entirely and jumped directly to the subordinate clause.
That is exactly the approach Congress took in drafting chapter 13.
Chapter 13 does not incorporate the “fair and equitable” standard in any
way. It gets directly to the present value test. Section 1325(a)(5) states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a
plan if . . .
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for
by the plan . . .
(B)(i) the plan provides that . . .
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan,
of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim . . . .

Consistent with our prior analysis of section 1129(b)(2)(A), by its
omission of “fair and equitable” from chapter 13, Congress signaled that
the chapter 13 present value test was to be interpreted without regard to
the absolute priority rule.
164.
165.

GERBER, supra note 25, at 729.
Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939).
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This contrast provides a coherent framework within which to locate
Till. Chapter 11 uses the phrase “fair and equitable”; chapter 13 does
not. Thus, chapter 11 cramdown analysis has to fit within the parameters
established by a century of Supreme Court decisions, which require
creditors to be “made whole” economically, but chapter 13 is free of that
requirement.
Till can thus stand on its own as a chapter 13 decision, separate and
apart from the business reorganization precedents it never mentions. But
conversely, it is those decisions, not Till, that courts should be turning to
when they confront cramdown proposals in chapter 11 reorganizations.
Courts applying Till in chapter 11 cramdowns are supervening
Congress’s intent that the absolute priority rule be satisfied in chapter
11, as well as the fact that the Court has written numerous times—from
Boyd to 203 LaSalle—that section 1129’s “fair and equitable” standard
includes the absolute priority doctrine.
B. MAKING SENSE OF TILL’S CHAPTER 11 DICTA
This statutory framework also provides a coherent explanation of
the dicta in Till concerning chapter 11—the “same approach” remark
and Footnote 14. In Till, the plurality’s remark that Congress “likely”
intended courts to use “essentially the same approach when choosing an
interest rate” to discount payment streams to present value throughout
the Bankruptcy Code does not mandate that courts use the exact same
method of calculating present value in every chapter.166 Rather, the
“same approach” dictum is better interpreted to say that courts should
adopt a present value method that comports with the statutory
particularities and administrative realities of the cramdown provision of
the chapter in question, as it did in Till. This is apparent in the decision
itself: on the very next page following the “same approach” remark, the
Court’s Footnote 14 suggests outright that chapter 11 cramdowns should
be handled differently than chapter 13 cramdowns by reference to “the
rate an efficient market would produce.”167 Footnote 14 then continues
by stating that, “in the Chapter 13 context, by contrast, the absence of
any such market obligates courts to look to first principles and ask only
what rate will fairly compensate a creditor for its exposure.”168 By
166.
167.
168.

Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2004).
Id. at 476 n.14.
Id. (emphasis added).
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contrasting cramdown under the two chapters, the plurality implicitly
adopts a perspective similar to the framework proposed in this article
that differentiates consumer bankruptcies from business reorganizations.
Such a framework allows greater flexibility in consumer bankruptcies,
while upholding Congress’s intention that chapter 11 cramdowns be
based upon the “fair and equitable” standard and the century of
precedents thereunder.
The Till plurality’s omission of any treatment of the “fair and
equitable” phrase can be interpreted as affording more leeway to chapter
13 plan terms in concordance with the implication of the statutory
scheme that chapter 13 was designed with individual debtor
rehabilitation, and not creditor protection, in mind. This is consistent
with the fact that section 1325 omits the “fair and equitable”
requirement and thus is free from the lengthy line of cases that construe
“fair and equitable” as mandating application of the absolute priority
rule. Given the history, the relevant statutory schemes, and the
peculiarities of the Till decision, the most informed way to reconcile the
plurality’s “same approach” remark with existing precedent and the
language of the Code is to interpret the chapter 11 cramdown provision
in the context of the “fair and equitable” precedents rather than
mandating use of the formula method. Meanwhile, the present value
language in chapter 13 should be interpreted in light of Till and the
specific administrative challenges of chapter 13 cases.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the implication of the decisions trending in the lower
courts, the Till plurality’s dicta was never intended to transform
cramdown standards in chapter 11. The proceedings in Till were so
focused on practical concerns unique to chapter 13 scenarios that its
reasoning should not be invoked elsewhere.169 The dicta on which the
Momentive and American HomePatient lines of cases rely do not
mandate application of Till to chapter 11, and, in fact,170 the “efficient
market” remark in Till’s Footnote 14 serves to underscore the Court’s
recognition that there are more differences than similarities between
chapter 13 and chapter 11 cramdowns.171

169.
170.
171.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part V.
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Courts should therefore take their lead from those Supreme Court
decisions that bear directly upon chapter 11 cramdowns. Those
decisions mandate adherence to the absolute priority doctrine and strict
application of the “fair and equitable” standard, both of which afford
protections to chapter 11 secured creditors that are not afforded to their
counterparts in chapter 13 consumer bankruptcies.”

